A Genealogy of Emancipatory Values by Smyth, Nick
A genealogy of emancipatory values
Nicholas Smyth
Department of Philosophy, Fordham University, Bronx, NY, USA
ABSTRACT
Analytic moral philosophers have generally failed to engage in any substantial
way with the cultural history of morality. This is a shame, because a
genealogy of morals can help us accomplish two important tasks. First, a
genealogy can form the basis of an epistemological project, one that seeks to
establish the epistemic status of our beliefs or values. Second, a genealogy
can provide us with functional understanding, since a history of our beliefs,
values or institutions can reveal some inherent dynamic or pattern which may
be problematically obscured from our view. In this paper, I try to make good
on these claims by offering a sketchy genealogy of emancipatory values, or
values which call for the liberation of persons from systems of dominance and
oppression. The real history of these values, I argue, is both epistemologically
vindicatory and functionally enlightening.
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A genealogy, in the philosophical sense, is a social history of some human
values, beliefs, concepts or institutions. What can a genealogy accomplish?
In my view, the answer is twofold. First, a genealogy can form the basis of
an epistemological project, one that seeks either to buttress or to under-
mine the epistemic justification for our beliefs or values. Second, a geneal-
ogy can provide us with functional understanding, since a history of our
beliefs, values or institutions can reveal some crucial pattern or mechanism
that is inherent to them and which is problematically obscured from our
view.
In this paper, want to do two things. First, I will argue that moral phil-
osophy has mainly failed to engage substantively with the social history
of morality. As a result, we lack a historically sensitive and philosophically
rigorous genealogy of contemporary values, and this is something we
badly need. Second, I will try to show how useful and illuminating such
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an account can be by offering a sketchy, tentative and provisional geneal-
ogy of certain contemporary moral values.
The values which will concern me here I label emancipatory values, and I
will be concerned with such values particularly as they have appeared in
the hearts and minds of people living in ‘Western’ countries. I do not
mean to suggest that such values are only particular to Western popu-
lations, and I will shortly caution us against any Western or Eurocentric tri-
umphalism about such values. The decision here is largely personal: as a
person inhabiting this particular evaluative profile, I want to know
whether I and those around me can acquire epistemological justification
for (and functional understanding of) our commitment to emancipatory
values.
Now, as I conceive of them, these are values which call for the liberation
of people from systems of dominance and tyranny. People who internalize
such values are sensitive to the plight of individuals at the bottom of social
hierarchies. In particular, they are sensitive to the ways in which individuals
within their own social contexts are rendered vulnerable to exploitation
and to domination. A classic articulation of emancipatory values can be
found in Frederick Douglass’ autobiographies, which combine powerful
sympathy for the plight of African Americans with unflinching anger at
their oppressors (Douglass 2007). Emancipatory values contrast with
what I will call natural order values, whose adherents are largely indifferent
to the existence of domination and vulnerability within hierarchies, mainly
because they conceive of one’s position at the bottom of a social hierarchy
as determined by one’s nature or essence as an intrinsically inferior being.
Aristotle’s defense of slavery is perhaps one of the best-known expressions
of natural order values, since he invoked precisely this style of argument to
justify the moral status quo.1
An interesting question, which I will not explore here, is that of the
relation between emancipatory and so-called ‘liberal’ values. From one
perspective, it looks very much like the aggressive drive for human eman-
cipation is at the foundation of liberal morality, since what the emancipa-
tory moralist seeks is negative liberty, or freedom from oppression and
domination. On the other hand, as its critics have long argued, liberal
models of moral and political justification can appear problematically
abstract or idealized (Mills 2005). That is, they remove the oppressed indi-
vidual from the very social and relational context which gives calls for
emancipation real meaning and force. I shall return to this paradox at
1See in particular (Aristotle 1998, 1254b21–23).
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the end of the paper, but for now, I only wish to be clear that this essay
concerns emancipatory value, and not so-called ‘liberal’ morality.
This prelude aside, my hope is that once my speculative genealogy of
emancipatory values is laid bare, we may become more confident that
such values are the product of comparatively virtuous social-historical pro-
cesses, or that they are to some extent justified in the epistemological
sense. Moreover, at the functional level, we may acquire an important
kind of understanding. Indeed, my suspicion is that we will learn that
such values function in a deeply positional way, such that their actual
operation involves some essential reference to some group or groups
who are the potential or actual victims of domination. This functional
understanding, in turn, can allow us to get clearer on just what is at
stake in real social conflict and on where the resolution of such conflict
might lie.
Before proceeding, I wish to acknowledge that these conclusions are
tentative at best. My history of emancipatory values will certainly be
incomplete and selective, and that some readers may find fault with it
in many respects. However, my purpose in this paper is not to directly
defend the accuracy of the account. Rather, it is to show how such an
account can provide us with the kind of epistemological and functional
understanding that we need.
Introduction: social epistemology
In the twentieth century, philosophers slowly became aware of the need
for social epistemology. Against the older image of the isolated Cartesian
knower, whose knowledge is grounded in purely personal acts of uncon-
ditioned intellect, we have rightly come to see that human beings are
inevitably enmeshed in powerful and expansive webs of thought,
feeling and convention. For most forms of knowledge, any model of
knowing which requires us to transcend this pervasive influence seems
hopelessly naïve.2
This observation produces new skeptical problems, and in the philos-
ophy of science, the key challenge was quickly recognized. Contemporary
scientific theories in physics, medicine, chemistry and biology, are plainly
the product of extremely messy social-historical processes.3 Relativist
2For an introduction to this literature, see (Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard 2010; Fricker et al. 2019).
3Popper did his best to shunt these processes into one side of his famous distinction between the context
of discovery and the context of justification, and advocates for the ‘genetic fallacy’ insisted that the
logical justification of scientific belief was entirely independent of the social and psychological processes
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skeptics quickly seized on this and insisted that the idea of objective scien-
tific truth could not survive these observations. However, those skeptics
were covertly employing the very Cartesian-rationalist ideal that needs
to be rejected. Noticing that science doesn’t live up to that standard,
they suggested that scientific knowledge must be indexed to a particular
social framework or paradigm. Thus, Thomas Kuhn famously described the
adoption of a new scientific theory as something akin to a ‘gestalt switch’,
something that just happens to a scientist rather than something that they
actively decide to enact (Kuhn 1962).
However, the move from this descriptive claim to relativism rested on a
mistake: once you notice that actual practice doesn’t fit the Cartesian
model of pure intellect operating in abstraction from empirical causes,
you needn’t abandon objective knowledge, rather, you may explore the
possibility of our succeeding by the lights of some other, more defensible
model of objective knowledge. In other words, there could well be some
way in which some social-historical processes, while not under anyone’s
direct conscious control, are nonetheless better or more knowledge-con-
ducive than others. An explosion of work followed, and social epistemol-
ogists quickly argued that scientific social networks look positively
virtuous from an epistemological standpoint. A diffuse body of well-con-
nected researchers regulated by a delicate balance of trust and skepticism
seems very likely to discover truths about the world (Kitcher 1995; Frost-
Arnold 2013; Wagenknecht 2016).
Moral philosophy has mainly failed to undergo this crucial transition. It
is particularly rare for analytic philosophers to actually engage with the
work of cultural historians, in spite of the fact that any defensible model
of morality must portray it as deeply mediated by contingent cultural
forces.4 Instead, the two dominant research paradigms investigate the
ways in which certain moral dispositions might have been selected-for
in deep evolutionary history (Hauser 2006; Wright 2010; Kitcher 2011)
and how they might have developed in fictional, idealized, game-
theoretical scenarios that do not resemble any actual human society
(Williams 2002; Pettit 2018). But these approaches cannot even constitute
the beginning of an answer to the skeptical problem. After all, no-one
thinks that the relativist challenge in science could have been met by
which produce it (Popper 1959; Cohen and Nagel 1934). Most epistemologists now reject this, since such
processes can plainly ground higher-order evidence about the reliability or justification of all kinds of
belief (Christensen 2010; Schoenfield 2018).
4Exceptions here are Jesse Prinz, Elizabeth Anderson and Shaun Nichols; see (Nichols 2002; Brady
and Fricker 2016; Prinz 2007). And of these three, only Anderson has wrestled with the specifically epis-
temological questions which are rather plainly raised by the cultural history of modern values.
4 N. SMYTH
the claim that some fictional, heavily idealized population might have
developed the theory of Special Relativity. Nor would it be answered by
the claim that humans evolved generally reliable inductive capacities.
That might be why it’s fine to believe in the trivial causal associations
that feature in ordinary experience. But Kuhn wasn’t worried about such
trivial ideas. He was worried about such propositions as: ‘disease is the
product of organisms which are invisible to the naked eye and which
attack our cellular structure’, or ‘time slows down as you approach the
speed of light’. These culturally local, historically novel beliefs fly in the
face of evolved common sense and emerged very late in human history.
How, Kuhn wondered, can we retain our belief that they are objectively
true, in light of their actual messy, contingent social history?
A great deal of contemporary moral belief, I wish to stress, is precisely
the same in all of these respects: it is as culturally local and historically
novel as human beliefs come. This is easy to see when we return to eman-
cipatory values, the primary target of this paper. Consider the following
claim:
Human beings ought to be free from exploitation and domination, and particu-
larly vulnerable populations ought to be protected from the worst dangers
associated with their vulnerability.
Large numbers of people not only affirm propositions like this, they regu-
late their moral activity in accordance with them. Disagreements abound
over just what counts as domination or vulnerability, and I shall return to
this important fact at the end of this paper. In addition, there are important
disagreements over the scope of emancipatory values – roughly, over how
enmeshed in a hierarchy one needs to be before one must show concern
for those at the bottom of it. But at a very basic level, the emancipatory
idea is more common than we often realize. Yet, from a historical perspec-
tive, the idea is about as novel or bizarre as Einstein’s propositions about
the relativity of time. The history of humanity is, in large part, characterized
by what I have called natural order values, violently inegalitarian moral
systems which rarely display much concern at all for those at the
bottom of a hierarchy. Yet, many people in Western countries (and,
indeed, outside of such countries), are profoundly opposed to natural
order values. This historical contrast is stark, and neither Darwinian
theory nor heavily idealized game theory can tell us anything at all
about it.
Now, recent political events may lead some to wonder just how
common emancipatory values could actually be in the West. Doubtless,
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the resurgence of xenophobic nationalism and racist sentiment should
give us pause, and I don’t wish to suggest that all or even most Westerners
genuinely accept the proposition above. I leave the current prevalence of
such values as an open empirical question; though, of course, any reader
with this worry will probably be an adherent, and should therefore be
interested in acquiring the kind of functional and epistemological under-
standing that I seek in this paper.
All of this being said, it is worth noting that members of these nascent
xenophobic or putatively regressive movements often defend their pos-
itions by citing emancipatory values. We might think that such references
are mistaken or confused, but we should not ignore the difference
between someone who believes:
We ought to keep migrants out of our country because they are intrinsically
inferior beings
And someone who believes
We ought to keep migrants out of our country because they are taking away
resources and employment opportunities from our poorest citizens.
Doubtless, this second claim may be unjustified and false in a number of
ways, but the point is that unlike the first claim, it directly invokes concern
for the worst-off in a given social context. It is therefore an expression of
emancipatory values, and under the assumption that it is sincere (and not
a mere post-hoc rationalization of a more explicitly racist attitude), it
betrays common moral ground with many who wish to relax border pol-
icies. That common ground is a shared sensitivity to domination and vul-
nerability, common ground which is decidedly absent in the case of the
natural order ethos expressed by the first claim above.
This underlying agreement is also evident in political philosophy. This
might not seem obvious, but consider the work of three thinkers who,
in contemporary political philosophy, are often taken to be at total odds
with one another: John Rawls, Iris Young, and Robert Nozick. Rawls
believed that a just, rational society is one in which the worst-off are
better-off, comparatively speaking, than they would be under any alterna-
tive social arrangement. Young argued that justice requires increased
attention to structural forms of domination and inequality which tend to
reinforce racial, sexual and gender-based hierarchies. And Nozick famously
believed that most forms of taxation constituted a kind of enslavement,
since a powerful entity with a monopoly on the use of force (the state)
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was permitted to appropriate the labor of ordinary citizens without their
consent (Rawls 1971; Nozick 1974; Young 2011b).
The consistent thread here which unites these disparate thinkers,
liberal-contractarian, progressive-socialist, and libertarian, is that each
shows a fundamental concern for those who are at the bottom of a
social hierarchy.5 Their conceptions of domination and oppression vary,
as do their senses of who the crucial dominators are, but they are
united, as are so many of us, in thinking that our fundamental moral
task is to ensure that all human beings can live productive and happy
lives free of domination. And this ethos, from the historical perspective,
is an extraordinary deviation from the human norm.
Now, this is not Western triumphalism or anything of the kind. First, as
Elizabeth Anderson rightly points out, emancipatory values were not just
the product of Western cultures, indeed, they emerged partly as a global
response to the horrors of Western imperialism (Brady and Fricker 2016).
Moreover, I should clarify the explanandum here: the widespread adoption
of these values might be said to have occurred in 1948 at the absolute ear-
liest, and even that is a stretch. It is common to think in terms of Enlight-
enment philosophers ‘inventing’ this ethos in the eighteenth century, but
that could only be the very beginning of what needs to be explained.
Moreover, even if people in European countries were among the first to
adhere to the emerging values, my point here is precisely that they have
not earned the right to any such triumphalism. Unlike philosophers of
science, we have yet to honestly confront the messy social history of
emancipatory values in a way which vindicates those values. The initial
emergence, spread and persistence of the ethos is increasingly well-under-
stood by social historians, but references to hypotheses entertained by
these historians are not to be found in much of the moral-philosophical
literature on this topic.6 Nietzsche once complained of the moral histor-
ian’s lack of ‘historical sense’, and he also poked fun at theorists who
5Where Rawls went wrong, in my view, is in portraying this concern as the result of pure decision-theory,
as a regulatory principle that would be necessarily chosen by any rational agent from behind the veil of
ignorance. It was, I believe, no such thing: his careful construction of the Original Position, along with the
imposition of the so-called ‘maximin’ rule for decision-making, is designed precisely to accommodate an
emotionally laden intuition he shared with most of us, a deep, prioritarian concern for the worst-off in
any given society.
6A recent exchange in Philosophical Studies neatly embodies this problem. Michael Huemer argues that the
emergence of liberal-egalitarian values supports moral realism. Against this, Jeroen Hopster insists that
various anti-realist models can explain the data just as neatly. While their shared explanandum is liberal-
egalitarianism, neither makes any reference to explanatory hypotheses advocated by the social histor-
ians who have written most extensively on this topic; such as Lynn Hunt, Christian Welzel, Micheline
Ishay, Samuel Moyn or Peter Stearns. Why, then, are they so confident that they know what ‘the
data’ is or what its best explanation consists in? See (Huemer 2016; Hopster 2019).
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think that Darwinian evolution can tell us much about contemporary mor-
ality.7 It’s hard to imagine that he’d have much difficulty registering these
same complaints today.
What is needed, then, is a mode of moral thinking which looks honestly
at its own social history and which can find, in that history, the hallmarks of
knowledge or progress. What would such a project look like?
Five constraints on a genealogy
First, a proper genealogy of emancipatory values would mostly avoid
what has been called the ‘history of ideas’. While we should of course
acknowledge the social power of newly articulated ideas, in my view,
our best social-psychology tells us that such ideas will normally
acquire currency only because they express some widely shared
emotional response or pattern which already exists in a group. So, to
study the articulation and transmission of ideas between privileged cul-
tural elites is often, at best, to scratch the surface of a phenomenon
such as the development under study here (Fairburn 1999). At worst,
it merely recapitulates the errors in self-understanding created and pro-
mulgated by that social elite.
For example, it is common for histories of torture to cite the writings of
the aristocrat Cesare Beccaria as a major influence on the abolition of
torture. But as historian Hans Joas points out, Beccaria’s work itself
refers to the abolition of torture in Sweden in 1734 and in Prussia by Frederick II
in 1740, decades before Beccaria’s book was first published in 1764. In France
the so-called parlements (courts of appeal) had progressively restricted torture
since the middle of the eighteenth century. (Joas 2013, 42–44)
Beccaria’s book, Joas writes, was ‘the expression of a much more profound
transformational process’. (44) In it, Beccaria provides a broadly utilitarian
defense of the abolition of torture, but the actual emerging practice was
more deontological in character, involving a historically novel sense
that certain moral barriers surround each human being, and that the
state’s extraordinary power over convicted criminals was something that
needed to be restrained. This is one way in which the privileging of
this text encourages a misunderstanding of the underlying social
transformation.
7From On the Genealogy of Morals I:7: ‘in [these] hypotheses, and after a fashion that is at least entertain-
ing, the Darwinian beast and the ultramodern unassuming moral milksop who ‘no longer bites’ politely
link hands… ’ (Nietzsche 1885/1989)
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Second, a proper genealogy of emancipatory values should focus pri-
marily on social forces. This does not mean we need to follow some
radical social epistemologists in thinking that knowledge itself is a prop-
erty of groups and not individuals; we may still retain the idea that it is
individuals, and not groups, who can be properly said to know things
(Lackey 2014). We can and should speak of groups ‘coming to know’ some-
thing, but this can just be a convenient way of saying that a large majority
of the individuals in that group have acquired some knowledge. So, the
positive task here will be to maintain our focus on social influence, on
the ways in which collections of individual knowers are affected by pro-
cesses that lie outside their direct control and that are in some way
bound up with broadly social phenomena (Brady and Fricker 2016).
My reason for insisting on this second requirement draws on the earlier
discussion of social epistemology. While it is logically possible that moral
belief is best explained by reference to individual factors that lie largely
within the conscious control of subjects, there is simply no good evidence
that this is normally so. As is the case with scientific beliefs, our best
models of individual moral beliefs portray them as the result of social
and historical processes which were set in motion long before individual
believers were even alive. For example, the notion that any of us believes
in the wrongness of slavery or in gender equality primarily because we,
individually, have found such ideas reasonable after conscious reflection
strains credulity.8 We are the inheritors of a vast, sprawling social tradition
which exercises enormous influence over each of us, and just as philoso-
phers of science refused to vindicate scientific belief by retreating to indi-
vidualist, Cartesian intellectualism, moral philosophers should avoid the
same mistake.
Third, and relatedly, a genealogy of emancipatory values should accom-
modate the central role played by the emotions and reactive attitudes in
the formation and spread of moral ideals. I lack the space to say much
about this requirement, except to say that, on my view, any model that
leaves out or downplays the emotions can only do so by ignoring a moun-
tain of accumulated evidence from psychology, history, neuroscience, and
indeed from common observation.9 Anyone, even a cognitivist who
believes that moral judgments themselves are only cognitions, ought to
at least accept that moral values are rather plainly intertwined with and
influenced by our emotional responses.
8I defend this anti-intellectualist claim in (Smyth 2017, 2019).
9For overviews of the scientific literature on morality and the emotions, see (Avramova and Inbar 2013)
and (Huebner, Dwyer, and Hauser 2009).
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Fourth, a genealogy of values should obey an epistemological require-
ment that is both intuitive and notoriously troublesome. When it comes
time to survey the causal-explanatory story for signs of progress, we
must avoid a certain form of circularity. That is, we must avoid saying
that the explanation displays signs of progress merely in virtue of the
fact that it has led us to the truth – to the adoption of emancipatory
value.10
I lack the space to fully defend this requirement here. All I can say is that
this maneuver is not necessary in the scientific case, and that it would
therefore be very suspicious if it were necessary in the moral case. One
does not have to accept modern medical theory in order to see that the
history of medicine shows clear, relatively theory-neutral signs of progress
(people generally live longer and are no longer as ravaged by disease as
they once were). Similarly, it should be possible to say where, in the
long history of emancipatory value, a person who is not committed to
that particular moral outlook might reasonably recognize marks of pro-
gress. This is not, I should hasten to add, the more severe (and far less
plausible) demand that anyone should recognize these marks: a moral
skeptic, by definition, won’t recognize signs of progress, just as
someone who is a skeptic about the existence of disease won’t recognize
medical progress. The point, rather, is that moralizers who are not com-
mitted to emancipatory values should, at least in principle, be able to
reasonably recognize our genealogy as vindicatory.11
Thus, in what follows I will try to avoid what few writers on moral pro-
gress have ever been able to avoid, that is, the purely self-congratulatory
exercise of assuming that my (contested, historically unusual) moral beliefs
are true and merely describing the process by which those beliefs arose.12
After all, a slave-owner could run a precisely symmetrical argument in
support of their pro-slavery beliefs, and surely we should aim for a
higher standard if it is attainable.
Fifth, and finally, it is important to bear in mind that a genealogy cannot
possibly show that our beliefs or values are justified in some absolute
sense. Genealogies portray transitions, movements from one social
configuration to another. They can do admirable work in showing that
this transition has resulted in a comparatively virtuous or justified state
10This requirement is very close to the idea that David Christensen labels independence. See (Christensen
2009).
11I defend this epistemological position in (Smyth 2017).
12For recent authors who engage in this form of circularity, see (Summers 2017; Hermann 2019). A phi-
losopher who denies that circular vindications of this sort are problematic is Kieran Setiya; see (Setiya
2012).
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of affairs. This is good, because in both science and ethics, we must think
of our knowledge as being grounded in a series of progressive transitions.
But a genealogy cannot aid us in fulfilling the distinct, much more ambi-
tious requirement, that we show that our beliefs or values are justified
in some non-comparative sense.13 So, a genealogist should avoid thinking
that, in telling their historical story, they will be able to show that our
beliefs or values meet some absolute standard. The most we can hope
for is to show that they constitute progress (Kitcher 2011).
Thesepreliminaries aside, I’ll nowproceed tomyextremely (onemight say
hopelessly) ambitious task, that of sketching a realistic, noncircular and pro-
gressive genealogy of emancipatory values. In doing so, I’ll try to draw on a
broad range of historians who have written on this topic, synthesizing
material from both Marxist and rational-choice historians as well as from
those who don’t cleave to any particular model of historical explanation.
Any such selection is going to be idiosyncratic, and I hope to pursue this
sort of explanation (and to properly defend my omissions) in a much more
detailed and exhaustive fashion in future work.14 If the reader doesn’t find
this historical analysis satisfactory, my hope is that they will nonetheless, by
the end of the paper, be convinced that we need something like it.
A (sketchy) genealogy of emancipatory values
There are, in any broadly causal explanation, two kinds of variables, prox-
imal triggers and background enabling conditions. In the standard example,
the striking of the match is the triggering cause of the flame, while the
presence of oxygen is an enabling condition. Any good explanation for
some new social phenomenon ought to be able to say what both kinds of
13This requirement is extremely (indeed, suspiciously) strong, and is not one we should impose upon our-
selves without very good reason. To illustrate by returning to the social epistemology of science: it is
important to show that modern disease theory is the product of comparatively virtuous processes,
that is, by comparison with older miasmic or humoral theories. If we fail to do so, surely we have
lost some justification for our confidence in disease theory. So, for example, we ought to be able to
say that general acceptance of this theory leads to far fewer deaths in the population than acceptance
of other theories. But it is not at all clear that disease theory needs to meet some absolute or non-com-
parative standard. Is there really some absolute reduction in the number of deaths that must be reached
for the theory to count as a success? This is not at all clear.
14For example, careful readers will notice that I do not follow some philosophers and historians in discuss-
ing the idea that modern egalitarianism is particularly influenced by the Christian view that all souls are
equal before God (Witte 2002). The reality is that this doctrine, which derives from Galatians 3:28 and
from a certain reading of Martin Luther, happily coexisted alongside some of the worst forms of insti-
tutionalized oppression ever devised for well over a thousand years. It may have acquired some rhetori-
cal importance for late liberation movements, but in my viewit simply cannot count as a major part of
the causal story. Moreover, I also do not discuss Athenian democracy as a historical tributary to modern
emancipation. This influence, I believe, is too distant to trace responsibly, and would involve a level of
detail that is impossible in a paper of this size.
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conditions were. Thus, while the French Revolution may have been triggered
by a sharp rise in the price of bread, it could not have happened without the
slow decline of the Church and the monarchy in the eyes of ordinary French
people, a loss of respect that had been centuries in the making.
In what follows, I’ll mention historical forces and events which begin
roughly in the sixteenth century. Any history must begin somewhere,
and I choose this moment only because it is when the first faltering articu-
lations of emancipatory value started to appear en masse in the tradition I
am focusing on. Bearing in mind that there is no magic ‘moment’ at which
such values came to hold sway in certain parts of the world, here, then, is a
story about how some people came to believe in emancipatory values. I’ll
begin with three enabling conditions: the emergence of phenomenologi-
cal inwardness, an increase in material and social resources, and the
growth of social connectedness. I’ll then emphasize authoritarian terror
as a key triggering condition before moving to the philosophical impli-
cations of this overall explanation.
Enabling condition 1: inwardness
First, there was a historical development that is both well-studied and puz-
zling. This is the emergence and increased prominence of inwardness, or
what Charles Taylor calls ‘radical reflexivity’ (Taylor 1989). Quite simply,
by the early 1700s, people were beginning to express themselves in
terms which strongly suggest an increased awareness of (and attention
to) their own feelings, thoughts, or subjective states.15
It is a fascinating fact that until Augustine, the collective writings of the
human race contained little extended, first-personal, reflective-autobiogra-
phical material. Read any ancient text you like, and you will almost certainly
never find the author telling you in their own voice about their inner life or
subjective experience. Even when writers tell the story of their own lives,
they regularly do so in what appears (to us) to be an oddly detached
style. And spiritual and meditative texts from every tradition – Indian,
Greek, Chinese or Stoic – virtually never reveal the voice of the author.
The author themselves is completely transparent: one almost never hears
them speak directly of their own emotions, perceptions or subjectivity.
Taylor traces the critical shift to Luther’s famous insistence, in the six-
teenth century, that each personmust discover their own personal relation
15I couldn’t begin to do justice to the large literature on this topic here. For discussions that I have found
useful, see (Fried 2005; Bos 1998; Cary 2000; Remes 2008; Carrithers, Collins, and Lukes 1985).
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with God through the holy sacraments and not through the mediating
influence of the church. And historian Lynn Hunt argues that this develop-
ment was radically accelerated by the emergence of the novel, which, by
comparison with most ancient texts, was positively orgiastic in its descrip-
tions of inner experience. The reaction to such descriptions was enthusias-
tic in the old sense of that word; literate persons all over Europe found
themselves emotionally transfixed by them, moved to tears and yet
unable to tear themselves away. Such was the reaction that church auth-
orities predictably began to ban or discourage the reading of novels such
as Rousseau’s Julie and Richardson’s Clarissa. An upper-class military gen-
tleman wrote to Rousseau:
You have driven me crazy about [Julie]. Imagine then the tears that her death
must have wrung from me… Never have I wept such delicious tears. That
reading created such a powerful effect on me that I believe I would have
gladly died during that supreme moment. (quoted in Hunt 2007)
The effect of these novels on their first readers is not easy to understand.
‘The novel’, writes Hunt, ‘works its effect through the process of involve-
ment in the narrative, not through explicit moralizing’ (Hunt 2007, 56).
This seems plausible, but Hunt goes on to claim, echoing an extremely
popular interpretation, that these ‘involved’ readers were undergoing an
expansion of empathetic response which led them to sympathize more
readily with the sufferings of others.16 But I think that this must be mista-
ken. I want to argue that this was not a mere ‘widening’ of empathetic
concern for previously ignored others. After all, most of the lead characters
in these early novels were women, yet women were the last traditionally
oppressed group to receive full rights and participatory citizenship in Euro-
pean nations. In the case of our upper-class gentleman, this excessive out-
pouring of sympathy towards a young, female character – on the part of a
French general who was probably as devoted to patriarchal norms as any
man of his station at the time – suggests that something more than ordin-
ary enlargement of empathy is going on, here. He is not really expanding
his circle of care, as philosophers like to say, since it is unlikely that this out-
pouring (experienced by so many others) had any real effect on his treat-
ment of women.
16This hypothesis dates back to the first philosophical reflections on the novel itself. See, for example,
(Diderot 1762/1966). And though its scientific credentials are questionable (Panero et al. 2016), it
remains extremely popular amongst philosophers and literary theorists; for various discussions see
(Keen 2007; Hammond and Kim 2014).
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On the contrary, immersing oneself in the inner lives of fictional charac-
ters seems to have awoken a powerful set of repressed desires and experi-
ences in the readers themselves. Such readers did not rush to acts of charity
and social improvement, as might be expected of people who have simply
learned to better empathize with the sufferings of others. Rather, their
overwhelming urge seems to have been to write down their own inner
response to the novels, to participate in the free expression of subjective
experience. Something in these people is learning to enjoy itself, and that
something, I suggest, is a set of responses and inner experiences which are
suppressed or rendered mute by prior social life.
Agents who have undergone this transition are, I claim, much more
likely to value and protect this inner existence. That inner life became
something to nourish, cherish, and express. In other words, European
culture was now prepared to receive and appreciate the well-known
moral argument that Kant gives in the Groundwork:
Rational nature exists as an end in itself. In this way man necessarily thinks of his
own existence; thus far is it a subjective principle of human actions. But in this
way also does every other rational being think of his existence on the same rational
ground that holds also for me; hence it is at the same time an objective principle
… The practical imperative will therefore be the following: Act in such a way
that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.
(Kant 1785/2002, s.429)
Now, I am not here violating my earlier requirement and retreating to the
history of ideas, since Kant didn’t invent this basic moral admonition. As
Nietzsche correctly argued, he was just systematizing an attitude that
was already in full force in the culture, an attitude that had been
gaining prominence as various people began to chafe against the bonds
imposed by the old European nobility.17
Notice too that Kant speaks primarily of what we must judge about
value, subjectively speaking, and not about what is valuable, in some
subject-transcending sense. This sort of argument, I claim, will only res-
onate in a culture which has begun to prioritize inner experience as a
source of moral value.
Similarly, it is only within such a culture that the infliction of suffering
can come to be seen as a fundamental evil, since the source of moral
value is relocated from the external to the internal, from social roles and
17‘Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumbfound the whole world, that the whole world was right
… He wrote against the scholars in favor of popular prejudice, but for scholars and not for the people’
(Nietzsche 1887/1974, 193).
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or cosmic orders to subjective feelings and experiences. This is what Allen
Buchanan calls ‘subject-centered’ ethics, and it is a vital precondition for
the emergence of emancipatory values (Buchanan and Powell 2018,
296–298). As Hunt puts it, only this kind of society can believe that ‘the
inner nature of humans provides a grounding for social and political
authority’ (Hunt 2007, 58).
Enabling condition 2: action resources
Next, no history of emancipatory values could ignore the general increase
in what political historian Christian Welzel calls ‘action resources’ (Welzel
2013). Action resources are the social and material resources that allow
agents to more effectively pursue their individual and collective goals.
Moreover, such resources dramatically widen the set of possibilities that
are salient to individuals, expanding their horizons and making new life-
paths salient.
For example, there are what Welzel calls intellectual resources. By the
1500s, the conditions were ripe for a rapid increase in the development
and promulgation of knowledge, skills, and information. The printing
press made these resources more durable, for example, and increased
literacy ensured that this would be no temporary development. In
addition, there are material resources such as tools and income, which
proliferate as markets begin to incentivize production and investment.
Now, I do not think it possible to reasonably deny, from a historical per-
spective, that capitalist modes of production were partly responsible for a
dramatic increase in available action resources. Critics of capitalism are
right to point to its extraordinary capacity for producing inequality and to
the hidden ways in which it restricts the autonomy of individuals (Anderson
2017; Fraser and Jaeggi 2018). The point here is not thatwe should cheerfully
accept whatever realities this mode of production produces. Indeed, capital-
ism itself did not begin toproducegeneral prosperity until its oligarchical ten-
dencies were restrained by the regulatory welfare state in the twentieth
century (as nascent emancipatory movements began to resist the evils of a
completely unfettered market). Until then, it remained, in the words of one
of its most vocal critics, ‘an industrial feudalism in which the worker
became anew “the serf of the workshop”’ (Blanqui 1885). This is why
Welzel is careful to note that his history of human emancipation ‘provides
no justification for pure market liberalism’ (Welzel 2013, 45).
But from the point of view of action resources themselves, properly
regulated capitalism is a profound historical success story, even if those
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resources are normally distributed in an unequal way. Food, shelter, cloth-
ing and tools are precisely the sorts of things that people need if they are
to create and sustain emancipatory values, and in the developed world the
average working-class person now has access to far more action resources
than their pre-capitalist ancestors, by a factor of at least 20.18
Why does this matter for morality? Action resources enable the devel-
opment and spread of emancipatory values because they ensure that
freedom and social dignity are worth much more to an agent. Persons
are simply less vulnerable to disease, to starvation and (especially) to
authoritarian terror, and this means that they can do more with the free-
doms they have. Moreover, in a purely causal sense, they provide new
moral ideas with a certain intergenerational durability and stability:
when populations can begin to enjoy long-term prosperity, connected-
ness and a growing knowledge-base, new moral ideals are less likely to
be ruthlessly stamped out or eliminated by war, oppression or misfortune.
For example, of an estimated 300,000 German peasants who joined the
Great Peasants’ Revolt in 1524–25, 100,000 were killed by the aristocratic
authorities. But, as Friedrich Engels himself pointed out, participants in the
German and Austrian revolutions of 1848 suffered no such fate; they were
far too materially secure to be threatened in this way, and in fact the worst
that most of them suffered was exile. (Engels 1850) Student and peasant
workers formed organized, armed insurrections, a pattern which was to
repeat itself in the Russian revolutions of 1917. Moreover, unlike the upris-
ings three centuries earlier, the 1848 revolutions led to real, permanent
change in various social and political structures, most notably the Frank-
furt Constitution, which very nearly resulted in the establishment of parlia-
mentary democracy, and which led to the permanent institutionalization
of public trials conducted by a jury. None of this could have happened
in the sixteenth century, simply because people lacked the action
resources necessary to produce this kind of effective and permanent revo-
lutionary movement.
Finally, it is worth noting that the occasional resurgence of natural
order value systems in the twentieth century was almost always pre-
ceded by a dramatic decline in action resources amongst ordinary
people. It is almost universally accepted amongst historians that the
emergence of fascism and totalitarian communism was enabled by
severe economic depressions which led to widespread starvation,
18For a useful online summary of this pattern, see https://ourworldindata.org/economic-growth. For a
book-length treatment of global economic growth from a historical perspective, see (Persson and
Sharp 2015).
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poverty and need.19 People who are rendered vulnerable in this way are
much more susceptible to hateful, Manichean ideologies which displace
responsibility for their suffering onto a real or imagined Other, and they
take real psychological comfort in the sense of order provided by tota-
litarian mythology. These recent cases only underscore the importance
of action resources for the development and consolidation of human
emancipation.
Enabling condition 3: mobility and social connectedness
When late-nineteenth century working class women in northern Britain
first encountered the revolutionary feminist ideals emanating from
London, they might have simply ignored them. After all, even though
their society possessed the intellectual resources necessary to transmit
those ideals, these women were relatively poor, isolated, and miles away
from the rebellious activity. For most of human history, this might have
been sufficient to motivate dismissive ignorance.
But many of them did not ignore these ideas. Instead, many had a
thought which their grandmothers could not have had: I’ll take the train
to London and join this movement. The sense of freedom and possibility
produced in these women was captured at the time by Rebecca West in
her short story Adela:
For the rest of her life her beauty and her intelligence would be prisoned blackly
in Saltgreave. The years would subdue her to the meanness and ugliness of Salt-
greave, and when she came to die she would see the chimney stacks of Salt-
greave’s soul against the sky…
And as she looked wildly over the fields, she saw that a road crossed the plains to
the little town. Somehow, this road fascinated her. It seemed the most desirable
thing in the world to walk along by the bent alders in the lively winds: to become
for a time a part of the joyful traffic of the plains… For the first time in her life
she felt fully the desire for the open road. Her cheeks flamed. Overcome by a
passion quite as sharp and fiery as any lust, she turned swiftly to make her
way out of the station on to that road.20
It is common to speak of ‘technology’ as an enabling cause for various
forms of social progress, but we should remember that this term is
merely a shorthand for some artifice that either enables human beings
to do something they already want to do or that provides them with
19For an excellent social history of this dynamic, see (Pelz 2016, 127–141).
20West 1914, quoted in (Liddington 2006).
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the means to form and pursue entirely novel goals. A complete
historical explanation that cites a technological advance must therefore
specify the practical aims that are enabled or produced by this
advance. In the case of technology which aided the development of eman-
cipatory values, the primary human aim is connectedness or group action.
And mass transportation technologies were crucial in the forging of social
connections across extraordinary distances. There is simply no chance that
the international women’s suffrage movement would have been so
effective had ordinary women not had the means to travel across long
distances.
Increased urbanization was also a factor in promoting connectedness:
while the cloistering together of the working class in large cities created
the conditions for new forms of oppression, it also strongly promoted
group action. The cumulative result is that co-ordinated responses to tyr-
annical social elites were now possible on a scale never before seen, and
this, I contend, was a vital precondition for the emergence of emancipa-
tory values.
These, then, are the three enabling conditions I wish to focus on: a
dramatic increase in mobility and connectedness, the creation of vast
new stores of action resources, and the culturally unique, emotionally
intense focus on subjective experience or the ‘inner life’. Having
described the kindling, I’ll now discuss what I take to be the most
important spark.
Trigger: severe oppression
The enabling conditions listed above created a social context capable of
supporting new ideals of equality and mutual tolerance. But these
values were not guaranteed to arise. Rather, large-scale acts of extreme
oppression were critical triggering causes, and, somewhat paradoxically,
technology and action resources actually incentivized some of these tyran-
nical acts and policies. These acts, I claim, provoked an emancipatory ethos
that was largely defensive in character.21 It was this fundamentally defen-
sive, reactive character of the modern moral sense that was memorably
summarized by Douglass:
Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will. Find
out just what any people will quietly submit to and you have found out the exact
measure of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon them, and these
21For a similar argument concerning the sources of liberalism, see (Young 2004).
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will continue till they are resisted with either words or blows, or with both. (Dou-
glass 1857)
Before there were rarefied philosophical treatises defending human equal-
ity or the ‘rights of man’, before Locke or Kant could provide broadly meta-
physical defenses of autonomy or universal rights, there were terrified,
angry populations trying to make sense of their own suffering and to
establish their own sovereignty or freedom from domination.
To put the point another way, consider the Star Wars films, among the
most popular in Western cinematic history. Notice that they portray a
moral axis which instantly resonates with modern viewers. A powerful
nobility deploys its military might in order to engage in brutal acts of
repression and authoritarian terror, and this nobility is opposed by a
plucky band of rebels whose righteous anger drives them to risk their
very existence for a slim chance at revenge and sovereignty. It is no exag-
geration to say that Douglass’ words quoted above would not sound out
of place in the mouths of the rebels of Star Wars.
In other words, I am confirming one of Nietzsche’s basic hypotheses:
that contemporary morality is in part a defensive reaction against severe
oppression by an elite aristocratic class. Nietzsche was right to perceive
fear and resentment at the heart of our moral outlook, and he was right
to think we commonly forget, obscure or cover over this fact. But he
was wrong to think that this necessarily invalidates or undermines that
outlook. Perhaps if we cling to old Cartesian or Platonic ideals, we must
necessarily be disappointed to learn that our values are not the product
of dispassionate reflection (Craig 2007). But, as with the philosophy of
science, we needn’t cling to such ideals.
I’ll now provide some key examples of severe oppression from various
points in recent world history. Most historians would, I gather, begin by
citing the religious wars and peasant revolts characteristic of the European
Reformation. The Catholic church, as was its custom, reacted with extreme
violence towards the emergence of a competitor, and massacre followed
counter-massacre as whole nations were torn apart by competing visions
of orthodoxy. Inspired by a new, more individualistic form of religion, Pro-
testantism, economically oppressed peasants all over Europe began to
demand agrarian reform, and were brutally suppressed by authorities.
The German Peasant Revolts mentioned earlier are just one of numerous
examples.
Next, of course, we cannot ignore chattel slavery, an institution marked
by unprecedented levels of cruelty and malice. The exploitation of African,
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Caribbean and South American populations produced intense resistance,
which flared up most notably in Haiti and Jamaica. When reading the mis-
sives sent by the leaders of rebel fighters during this time, it is impossible
to miss the defensive character of the newly emerging moral framework:
For too long, Gentlemen, by way of abuses which one can never too strongly
accuse to have taken place because our lack of understanding and our ignor-
ance—for a very long time, I say, we have been victims of your greed and
your avarice. Under the blows of your barbarous whip we have accumulated
for you the treasures you enjoy in this colony; the human race has suffered to
see with what barbarity you have treated men like yourself… over whom
you have no other right except that you are stronger and more barbaric than
we… 22
Finally, there was a development which was to prove positively cata-
strophic for working-class populations around the world, the emergence
of total war (Bell 2014). For example, while it is not common to speak of
the combatants who died in the World Wars as victims of oppression,
this is surely true in some sense. During the First World War, millions
were doomed to suffer the machine gun, poison gas and concussive
shell fire, commanded by a bumbling aristocracy which saw its ancient
claim to intrinsic social authority promptly disintegrate upon the cessation
of hostilities (Kinross 1933, 72–74; Maier 2015). It is difficult to find a case in
which what I have called natural order values were undermined more deci-
sively. And the Second World War, of course, was sparked by murderous
fascist regimes who convinced huge segments of the population to face
death in combat in order that those regimes might continue to murder
and repress other huge segments of the population. In both cases, the
recruitment and targeting of the ordinary working class reached unprece-
dented levels, and tens of millions died for the authoritarian utopias or pol-
itical alliances in the minds of a few dozen men.
My hypothesis is that such intense, large-scale oppression leads human
beings to search for a defensive weapon, and the ideal of human emanci-
pation is the most effective weapon of this sort that has ever been
designed. Once it is institutionalized and backed by the coercive power
of the state, it offers ordinary people protections and privileges that
their ancestors could scarcely dream of. This slow institutionalization,
while still an ongoing project fraught with its own dangers, is only possible
in a culture which has learned to prioritize subjective experience as a
primary source of moral value, which has developed the level of social
22Letter from Jean-Francois Biassou, quoted in (Louverture 1953, 62–64).
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connectedness within which the demands of the oppressed can become
properly contagious, and which provides ordinary persons with the action
resources necessary to make rebellion both feasible and permanent.
Bearing all of this in mind, it’s now time to return to the philosophical
arena and ask: what normative lessons can we draw from this genealogical
sketch? I’ll start with epistemology, and I’ll conclude this paper with some
thoughts on the function of emancipatory morality.
The social epistemology of emancipatory values
At the outset, there are several negative lessons that we must draw in the
field of moral epistemology. The first is that purely rationalist explanations
for the emergence of modern morality look hopeless. This is a process that
is essentially infused with all sorts of powerful emotion, and it is simply
wishful thinking to believe that this moral system could have emerged
as the result of such things as dispassionate reflection and interpersonal
testimony. The second lesson is that we must reject related claims,
made by several writers, that such things as ‘self-interest’ or ‘class interest’
are distorting factors on moral belief (Boyd 1988; Enoch 2009). Our history
has shown that these claims are by no means obvious or defensible, since
protective, self-interested or class-interested anger is a key motivator of
resistance and revolution.
But what of positive lessons? Is ours a history which shows definite signs
of progress? I wish to remind the reader that my question here is only com-
parative or contrastive. So, the inquiry here concerns relative justification
that is embedded in the notion of progress, and not the kind of absolute
justification that comes along with thinking of knowledge in some non-
contextual or pure sense.
I have claimed that emancipatory values emerged when people began
to reject natural order values. Recall that I gave the label natural order to a
moral system which remains largely indifferent to domination or vulner-
ability, mainly because it conceives of one’s position at the bottom of a
hierarchy as the result of one’s natural inferiority. Well, the emerging
picture suggests that natural order values, which are historically dominant,
will generally flourish only in a society which has the following features.
First, the society must repress the inner life of individuals. It must encou-
rage or produce a mode of existence which might be described as lonely.
Ordinary individuals in such societies will of course experience the normal
range of emotions and thoughts, but there will not exist a social feedback
mechanism which encourages them to reflect on those inner states or to
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share and express them in the ways with which we are now familiar. Their
moral sources will thus remain external, located in a cosmic order or a set
of pre-determined social roles.
Second, a society dominated by the natural order conception must
remain poor and intellectually stagnant. It must lack the kinds of action
resources that enable coordinated action and the spread of new moral
ideals. Most of the population must remain profoundly vulnerable to the
power of social elites; their economic desperation, hunger and their sus-
ceptibility to disease and blight will mean that social autonomy is
simply not a particularly valuable or desirable thing.
Third, its population must remain relatively immobile and unconnected.
This is not to say that it cannot engage in group action, but rather that
such action is far more difficult because the society lacks the kind of
social and technological developments which produce connectedness.
Now, in the transition from natural order to a more emancipatory ethos,
can we ascertain theory-neutral signs of progress? That is, can we reason-
ably portray ours as a society which has created the social conditions for
moral knowledge-acquisition, as it clearly did for scientific knowledge-
acquisition?
The answer, I believe, is a cautious ‘yes’. The common thread that runs
through all of these enabling conditions can be stated rather simply:
natural order values flourish when most human beings in a society
cannot fully exercise their social, intellectual and emotional capacities,
when, comparatively speaking, conditions are such that they cannot
feel, think, or interact in the ways that we know they can. All human
beings possess an inner emotional life, yet in societies dominated by
natural order values, that life remains comparatively hidden, both to
society in general and to the individual themselves. All human beings
think and reason, transmitting new ideas along social networks, yet in
this society, their ability to do so is radically limited by the absence of tech-
nology and resources. Hunger alone is a powerful limiting force here, as is
the lack of connective technology and the scarcity of action resources. Vir-
tually all human beings seek to interact and to forge social networks in
order to engage in coordinated action. Indeed, morality itself is largely a
process by which such networks are formed and maintained. Yet, stran-
gely, a certain set of historically dominant values seems to require the sup-
pression of our ability to do just that.
Our epistemological question, then, to anyone who adheres to more
ancient, inegalitarian values must be: why does widespread belief in
your value system seem to result from the relentless suppression of
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ordinary human capacities in social groups? Surely, any valid or correct set
of ideas or principles ought to be able to flourish where human beings are
able to exercise their capacities to think, feel and interact. This observation
applies in any domain: it would be very strange for a set of justified beliefs
to be (a) objectively true, and yet to (b) require the suppression of ordinary
human capacities in most knowers. There is no other domain of putatively
objective knowledge where this is so. We do not find that mathematical
knowledge increases under these conditions, nor do we find that wide-
spread poverty, hunger, psychological repression and comparative social
isolation lead to any other useful advance in understanding. So why
should such suppression be necessary, here? What sense is there in objec-
tive knowledge which only flourishes in a population that is suppressed in
this fashion?
This, then, can be a powerful source of confidence in emancipatory
values: a genealogy which shows that they, by comparison with their his-
torical rivals, flourish under conditions which almost anyone can see are
epistemically virtuous. With this epistemological analysis out of the way,
I’ll conclude by examining what sort of functional conclusions we might
draw from this genealogy.
Functional misunderstanding
The social function of any set of practices, values or ideas can, in principle,
be revealed in the way that functions in other domains are revealed.
Sometimes, the best explanation for an entity’s emergence and persist-
ence will be that it is disposed to produce some effect. When we have a
reasonably complete and informative explanation of this sort, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the entity’s function is to produce those
effects, on the assumption that the original enabling conditions haven’t
changed too much (Millikan 1984; Smyth 2016).
If the explanation above is basically right, then we have good reason to
think that the social function of much contemporary morality is to effec-
tively put a stop to tyrannical domination. The reason that emancipatory
values emerge and persist is precisely that they provide the basis for
such a response. This in and of itself should not be surprising, but it can
serve as a useful reminder. Such values are intrinsically positional, requiring
some reference to actual or hypothetical oppressors, who themselves do
not receive any determinate moral status. The social function of emancipa-
tory morality is thus not to produce anything like ‘mutually beneficial
cooperation’, as evolutionary genealogies often declare, but it is rather
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to protect the vulnerable from oppressor classes in a way that is decidedly
non-mutual.23 These values only function if our moral attention is firmly
fixed on such phenomena as vulnerability and oppression, and they will
fail to function if our attention remains elsewhere.
Now, it might be thought that I am making the following argument:
since protection of the vulnerable is good, the discovery of this function
thereby vindicates a great deal of contemporary morality. It is crucial to
see that I cannot make this sort of argument, which enjoys great popularity
amongst those who wish to vindicate moral ideas by uncovering their
function(s).24 The argument, as it stands, plainly violates the anti-circularity
requirement named above, since it simply assumes, without argument,
that emancipatory values are essentially correct, that protection of the vul-
nerable is in fact good. This maneuver, I believe, accomplishes nothing of
any value. Notice that one of the primary functions of a contrary, natural
order value system is probably the maintenance of social dominance,
but the fact that this would have pleased adherents to that system is of
no normative interest whatsoever. Our vindication cannot be as empty
as this.
My point in this section is more subtle: I am claiming that functional
understanding can help us to correct mistaken conceptions of our
values. This, in turn, can allow us to better understand what is at stake
in real social conflict. Many of us who embody emancipatory values
often speak of ourselves as being committed to equality, for example,
and some of us see this commitment as grounded in a kind of social con-
tract or tacit agreement. But these, I will argue, are distortions.
I can illustrate this point by returning to pop culture. Would we really
have understood a Star Wars (or a Lord of the Rings, a Harry Potter series,
a Wonder Woman or a Black Panther) which concluded in a mutually ben-
eficial peace treaty between the dominating armies of darkness and the
populations they’ve terrorized, tortured and murdered? These stories
can only end in the total annihilation of evil because the moral schema
of the viewers demands it, because the social function at the core of
that schema is protective rather than conciliatory, agonistic rather than
mutualistic.
But this fact is routinely obscured by the language we use to describe
our moral values. We speak, in non-positional and highly abstract terms, of
inalienable human rights. We sometimes assume, in turn, that efforts at
23For a broadly evolutionary perspective that actually dovetails nicely with mine, see (Boehm 2009)
24See, for example, (Kitcher 2011). I criticize Kitcher in (Smyth 2016).
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liberation or emancipation must be aimed at restoring some ideal cosmic
balance represented by the propositions of egalitarian human rights
theory. Yet, many of the core concepts which actually drive our moral
system are those of vulnerability, domination and disproportionate
suffering.
This misunderstanding has been strongly encouraged by the rationalist
tradition, which has routinely portrayed moral progress as an ‘expanding
circle’ of moral concern driven by the cognitive recognition of non-pos-
itional sameness (Singer 2011; Campbell and Kumar 2012). These theorists
see us as being driven by the purely logical demand to ‘treat like cases
alike’, and to therefore reject such things as gender, ethnicity, race and
class as bases for differential treatment. This story, I claim, encourages
functional misunderstanding. By refusing to even acknowledge the cen-
trality of power-struggle to the development of contemporary morality,
this narrative simply leaves out too much of the relevant history. Most
importantly, it encourages us to focus on the wrong place: what is
morally salient, from the point of view of emancipatory value, is not same-
ness. It is social difference, positional facts about persons and the hierar-
chies they inhabit.
Note too that this rationalist conception goes hand in hand with the
false reading of the character-driven novel mentioned earlier, whereby
we see such works as triggering the expansion of the so-called ‘circle of
care’ by revealing something shared between reader and fictional charac-
ter. The real history of our values, which is still, in many ways, being
written, reveals that this moral stance is always positional, involving an
implicit reference to difference – to those who are vulnerable to domina-
tors and to the dominators themselves.
And while I am not the first to make this charge, the social contract tra-
dition must also be charged with obscuring the real social function of our
moral and political values. By portraying them, even metaphorically, as a
kind of peace-treaty between equals, that tradition strongly encourages
us to think in purely legalistic terms about the content of that hypothetical
contract, and not about real power relations.25 But a huge array of our
values will only work if they are responsive, in a decidedly non-
reciprocal manner, to social inequality.
Once we understand that our history reveals a deep social function at
the heart of much contemporary morality, we can see that this process
25See, for example, David Gauthier’s extraordinary claim that ‘our thoughts and activities, insofar as they
concern ourselves and our relationships, are best understood by supposing that we treat all of these
relationships as if they were contractual.’ (Gauthier 1977).
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of forgetting about power can easily lead to real-world dysfunction. For
example, as anthropologist Lori Allen has shown, the institutionalization
of ‘Human Rights’ doctrine in Palestine has been strikingly ineffective,
and she argues that this failure can be largely traced to the ways in
which that doctrine has become unresponsive to the power structures
which permeate the lives of all citizens. This should not be surprising,
since, as historian Samuel Moyn has shown, virtually none of the anticolo-
nial movements of the twentieth century deployed or relied on any uni-
versalist notion of ‘human rights’ or ‘basic equality’ (Moyn 2012). The
people who collectively enacted the greatest liberation movement in
world history simply fought for their positional sovereignty in the face of
domination. Any moral regime which emphasizes universalism and
human sameness, even with the best of intentions, will likely produce
moral dysfunction.
Finally, in acquiring this functional understanding, both philosophers
and social activists can better appreciate the dynamics of contemporary
political clashes. We can begin to see that the perspectives represented
by Rawls, Young and Nozick are each, in their own way, grounded in
the concern that social institutions can become deeply dysfunctional by
failing to protect the people they are designed to protect. Much political
debate, I have already suggested, is implicitly over who ought to be pro-
tected from whom. This shared ground should lead us to ask one final
question, which greatly occupied Young in particular: what is social dom-
ination (Young 2011a)?26 The genealogy provided cannot give us an
answer to this question, but it certainly indicates the need for one.
These, then, are the sorts of conclusions that we can draw from a
responsible, historically accurate genealogy of our values. First, we can
draw conclusions about the epistemic status of those values, and
second, we can develop a better understanding of how the values actually
function. A reader might find fault with the history given here – indeed,
given its necessarily sketchy and selective character, they probably
should! But I hope, at least, they can now see why moral philosophy
should no longer avoid the social history of morality. That history, like
the social history of science, can be a source of much-needed confidence
and understanding.
26See also (Pettit 1997; McCammon 2015; Lovett 2010; Wartenberg 1990).
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